This report will deal with the published version of whether the attack on Nord Stream Pipelines 1 and 2 on 26 September 2022 at 2.03 am and 7.04 pm with 6 people and the sailing boat ‘Andromeda’ could have been carried out in terms of organisation, technology and timing. Various influences and factors will be taken into account. Overall, a complex picture emerges, which is analysed in individual points. For some components, no physical evidence is available, which is why clarification can only be based on circumstantial evidence and reverse conclusions.
Image and video material, statements from third parties, technical data, reports and diving-specific calculations were collated for the research.
Finally, a probability estimate is made after analysing the individual points, which represent a result based on known facts and exclusion criteria. However, these have comparable probative value.
1 The boat
The sailing boat is a Bavaria50, a popular charter type with a length of approx. 15 metres. The boat offers space for 10 people in 5 cabins. The technical equipment corresponds to the usual standard. There is a folding bathing platform aft.
1.1 Technical data:
Total length: 15.70m
Width: 4.49m
Dry weight: 13500kg
Max. weight: 16000kg
Payload: 2500kg
Fresh water: 787l
Diesel: 321l
Engine: 75hp Volvo Penta D2-75 A
Consumption at 8Kn: 7l/h
Anchor: Cobra anchor 25kg with 75m chain
Fig. 1 ‘Andromeda’ in motion
Fig. 2 ‘Andromeda’ aft with folding bathing platform
2 The crew
The crew of the ‘Andromeda’ is said to have consisted of 2 divers, 2 diving assistants, 1 doctor and the skipper. Nothing concrete is known about their identity or their skills. There is also no definite information about the organisation and financing of the mission.
One possible reason why the team may have consisted of 4 divers is that one diver and assistant worked in daily rotation with the other two. The doctor was certainly specialised in diving medicine to monitor the divers' blood tests for dissolved gases and to detect possible nitrogen saturation or O2 poisoning.
Suspected traces are said to lead to Poland and Ukraine. Requests for administrative assistance from German authorities to the relevant countries have not been made, as this would allegedly involve disclosing the results of the investigation.
3 The logbook
The tour began and ended in the harbour ‘Hohe Düne’ in Rostock. During this time there were difficult weather conditions with strong winds and swell. The following dates are known:
06.09. Departure Rostock
07.09. Arrival Wiek/Rügen
08.09. Departure Wiek
16.09. Arrival island Christiansö/DK
18.09. Departure island towards Poland
19.09. Arrival Kolberg/Poland
20.09. Departure Kolberg
22.09. Arrival Wiek
23.09. Departure Wiek and arrival in Rostock
Fig. 3 Overview map
According to the known log data, the possible period for the dives is from 08.09. to 16.09. This may result in the following sequence, assuming a boat speed of 10Kn:
08.09. Departure from Wiek. Arrival south-east of Bornholm in the evening (approx. 150km)
09.09. 1st dive to strand A of NS 2
10.09. 2nd dive to strand A of NS 2
11.09. 1st dive to strand B of NS 2, drive to north-eastern area (approx. 75km)
12.09. 1st dive to strand A of NS 1
13.09. 2nd dive to strand A of NS 1
14.09. 1st dive to strand B of NS 1
15.09. 2nd dive to strand B from NS 1
16.09. 1st dive to strand B from NS 2 (but mistakenly to strand A.) Departure from the sea area and arrival at Christiansö/DK)
This information should be regarded as an example. The exact sequence of days is irrelevant, as 8 dives would theoretically be possible during this period.
4 The pipeline
4.1 The construction
The pipes of the Nord Stream Pipelines are concrete-coated steel pipes. Each individual pipe is 12 metres long, has an outer diameter of approx. 1.15 metres and weighs between 24 and 25 tonnes.
Fig. 4 Pipeline elements before the connection
The difference results from the wall thicknesses of the steel of 26.8 - 34.4 mm. There is a pressure of approx. 210 bar in the feed area. In the receiving area, the gas pressure is only approx. 170 bar.
The steel used was moulded and welded sheets of the special steel X100. The sheathing (approx. 11 cm) consisted of concrete containing aramid fabric and fibres for reinforcement. It serves to protect the steel pipe from damage and corrosion. It is also intended to prevent the pipeline from floating. The pipe elements were welded on the inside and outside and corrosion protection was applied. The seam areas were sealed with polyurethane and sleeves.
As is usual for the offshore sector, the pipes were manufactured and certified in accordance with the DNVGL standard DNVGL-ST-F101 and DIN EN 14161. The service life should be 50 years. The fulfilment of the safety values is relevant. These include corrosion, pressure resistance (working pressure up to 220 bar, safety pressure 280 bar), tensile and shear forces as well as resistance to deterministic effects caused by movement of the seabed, anchor forces from impact or dragged anchors, impact from ship cargo, impact from flotsam or sinking ships and even impact from munitions.
According to Nord Stream, the pipes could withstand an explosion of two tonnes of explosives at a distance of twelve metres from the pipeline without leaking.
4.2 The course of the pipelines
On the Swedish side, strings A and B of NS 2 run parallel to each other for approx. 45 metres in the blasting area. At NS 1, the distance between the two strings is approx. 90 metres. The distance between NS 1 and NS 2 is approx. 1200m. In the Danish area, the strands of NS 2 run approx. 80m apart.
Fig. 5 NS 1 and NS 2 north-east of Bornholm on the Swedish side
Fig. 6 Strings A and B of NS 2 south-east of Bornholm on the Danish side
5 The detonation
5.1 The explosive
Controlled blasting is required to achieve the desired degree of destruction. Physical and structural conditions (material, statics, material transitions, etc.) and environmental conditions must be included in the calculations. They form the basis for the type, quantity, number and position of explosives.
According to investigations, HMX explosives were allegedly used. This is a high-speed military explosive that is mainly used for nuclear weapons. Homocyclonite or HMX (High-Molecular-weight rdX), also known as octogen, is mainly used by the USA.
With a detonation speed of 9100m/s, it is significantly faster than TNT at 7000m/s. Depending on the density, the energy released can be up to 5.44 megajoules/kg.
Although HMX is available on the black market, the quantities required would have been too conspicuous to procure and would not have gone undetected.
TNT is the ‘benchmark’ for explosives. It is relatively easy to procure, has a high energy release (detonation speed of 7100m/s) and can be used in a variety of ways.
CL20 can also be virtually ruled out. Although it has stronger properties than octogen, it is not suitable for this type of work due to its lower thermal stability and impact sensitivity. It is also difficult to obtain.
Semtex is also an effective explosive that is easier to procure, but it contains markers for tracing.
Like Semtex, C4 has hexogen as its main component. Although its explosive power does not reach that of HMX, it is significantly higher than that of TNT. Its properties make it very versatile. It would be the first choice for this job.
The bursting of individual pipes can only be planned, as this is the only way to prevent faster repairs.
It was certainly not possible to calculate the exact quantity of explosives for this project, as expert reports on deformation limits and burst loads were not available. These are company secrets and only known to Nord Stream AG and the German government for the approval process. It is also highly doubtful that values from practical tests were available. Therefore, the amount of explosives would have to be generously dimensioned in order to achieve a high level of safety in terms of destruction.
The 1992 explosion in Sicily, in which 100 metres of road including cars were literally torn apart, could be roughly comparable. 500kg of TNT were used for this damage.
Pessimistically, it is assumed that each explosive device was only 40kg, which was placed alternately on the inside and outside of the seam area. A larger quantity of explosives would be even more unrealistic for transport and shipment. The aim of these destructions is a massive sudden increase in the internal pressure of the pipes. As a result of the detonation waves, the pipeline breaks apart at the weakest points, namely the seams. The amount of explosives is mainly responsible for the seismic shocks. The escaping gas would only have played a minor role.
5.1 The profiles of the explosions
NS 1 A and B and NS 2 A on the Swedish side show different deformations on the pipes and the cratering caused by the explosions. Both NS 1 A and NS 1 B show comparable characteristics.
Fig. 7 Damaged area of NS 1 A and B in cross-section (based of Erik Andersson)
Fig. 8 3D image of NS 1 calculated from sonar data (based of Erik Andersson)
Fig. 9 3D image of NS 2 A from sonar data on the Swedish side (based of Erik Andersson)
As can be seen in Figure 7, there are 5 craters each at NS 1 A and B over a length of approx. 250 to 280m. They have a depth of approx. 5 to 18m.
This signature indicates that point no. 1, 3 and 5 must have been the main detonations. The distance between the outer points and the centre is approx. 120m. If explosive charges are attached to these 3 points and detonated simultaneously, pressure waves are created that move the gas in the pipeline towards each other. They then meet halfway. This would be the case at points 2 and 4. As a result, a massive overpressure is created between points 1 and 5. Together with staggered placement (inside and outside), high shear forces are created that separate the pipe elements at the seams.
The craters are located exactly above the seams and are the result of the explosive charges and washout caused by the gas leakage. Deformations of the pipe elements show at the seams from the inside to the outside. This also indicates that the gas has not ignited due to a lack of oxygen, but has simply escaped. The amount escaping from each section was approx. 9800 tonnes for NS1 with a maintenance pressure of 50 bar and approx. 20400 tonnes for NS2 with 104 bar.
The profile of a single explosive charge would produce a completely different picture. The quantity of explosives would also have had to be significantly increased in order to achieve safe destruction. A possible break-up at the weld seams would not have occurred over a length of approx. 250 metres.
At NS 2 A on the Swedish side, only a single explosive device (Fig. 9) detonated on the side of the pipeline, which could not have had the explosive force as at NS 1, even if the pipeline was already depressurised at this point. There are no multiple craters or swirling pipes here. Only a single one-sided crater of approx. 4 x 8m with a depth of 4m is recognisable.
The detonation of Line A of NS 2, 17 hours earlier, on the Danish side also left a seismic anomaly with a magnitude of 2.1. The receiving station in Lubmin registered a very brief but strong overpressure before the pressure drop. This pipeline was filled with methane at a pressure of 104 bar.
This detonation must therefore also have been powerful if the receiving station at a distance of approx. 150 km still noticed the increase in pressure. As the damage pattern here is similar to that of NS 1, the 3-charge theory can also be assumed here.
From 31 August 2022, Gazprom stopped deliveries via Nord Stream 1, which was only filled with a residual pressure of approx. 50 bar per line up to the day of the shutdown. These pressures must have been known at the planning stage.
The fundamental question is why there were 2 explosion zones at all, namely south-east and north-east of Bornholm. Nord Stream 2 could also have been sabotaged in the north-eastern area together with Nord Stream 1. Both attack sites are only about 70 kilometres apart.
The second question is why strand A of NS 2 was blown up at both locations, while strand B remained undamaged along its entire length.
The only logical conclusion is that a mistake was made during the execution. A problem may have occurred during the installation of the explosive device on line B on the Danish side, so that no load could be placed there. That is why it was cancelled there.
It was decided to make up for this when in the Swedish area for the task for NS 1. There may have been a mix-up or navigational error here, so that strand A was blown up again instead of strand B.
In total, at least approx. 400kg of explosives must have been used for the 10 successful blasts.
6 The dives
Introduction
In principle, the necessary diving cylinders should have been available on board for all planned and realised dives. As every dive would be carried out with compressed air well outside the no-decompression limits, this means a supply of cylinders with the corresponding mixtures.
The supply of cylinders would be drastically reduced if the cylinders required for a dive were refilled with a compressor on board, but this would require a special petrol-driven compressor for mixed gas. It is highly doubtful whether such a system could have been installed below deck. In addition, the weight is over 250kg. In addition, appropriate storage cylinders for oxygen, nitrogen and helium would have had to be on board. This version is therefore not being pursued any further.
There is no evidence that an underwater scooter or other aids were used to reach the blasting sites. The boat must have been directly above all the installation sites, as the distances between the individual sites are too great and would have considerably increased the bottom times of the dives (see 4.2). The shortest distance between 2 sites is approx. 120 metres. Compass navigation would also not have been accurate due to the underwater cables running nearby.
Variant A
If a descent had been carried out between 2 blast points, 4 divers (2 working divers and 2 assistants) would have been involved. After the descent, each of these divers would have had to cover a distance of approx. 60 metres for placement. This would have required a time of at least 15 minutes for the outward and return journey alone, including the transport of the explosive devices. Another 15 minutes are assumed for the installation. This means that the pure basic time is at least 30 minutes. One assistant is at the bottom to secure the boat. The other is at a depth of approx. 30 metres to supply the required diving cylinders.
A total of at least 7 dives must have been carried out. In fact, there must actually have been 8 dives, as there is no indication why there should have been no dive or attempt to NS 2B on the Danish side.
If you take the time frame from point 3 as a basis, there must have been dives with a full crew every day.
Variant B
The descent to each blasting site was carried out separately. This would have required 1 diver and 1 assistant. The basic time would not change, as there would be no transport time, but time for securing the boat. This could only have been done with 2 teams in daily rotation.
In both variants, there would still have to be enough pure oxygen available on board for the divers after the dive to reduce the remaining nitrogen saturation. If this is not done and the next dive begins after at least 24 hours, this must be taken into account in the calculation. The decompression time of subsequent dives would continue to increase.
6.1 Required gas volume and duration
The following assumes a diving depth of 75 metres with a bottom time of 30 minutes per dive. In the Swedish area, the depth is even between 78 and 80 metres.
As an example, the descent and bottom time are carried out with 2 x 10 litre double packs of Trimix (16 % O2, 53 % He, 31 % N). During the ascent and deco stops, 1 x 10 litre double pack of EAN50 and then 15 litres (100 % O2) are used. This means that 7 cylinders are required per working diver. For the assistants, 5 cylinders. This is assumed for variant B.
Fig. 10 Dive planning with Subsurface
The entire dive would take approximately 161 minutes.
Fig. 11 Schematic representation of variants A and
Fig. 11 Schematic representation of variants A and B
As this is not a recreational dive with normal equipment under ideal conditions, the AMV must be calculated at least 40 % higher due to various factors such as visibility, light conditions, current and work to be carried out. The additional safety reserves of 50 bar per cylinder were also not taken into account.
The total number of cylinders of different mixtures is at least 70 cylinders for the divers and 50 cylinders for the assistants for variant A. For variant B, 84 cylinders for the divers and 50 cylinders for the assistants. This would be a total of 120 or 124 cylinders respectively.
This would rule out variant B for logistical reasons. The proportion of oxygen cylinders is not yet taken into account for nitrogen desaturation on board.
6.2 Possible realistic procedure
The boat is navigated precisely over the damaged area with the aid of sonar/echo sounder. A sheet rope is then lowered so that divers can orientate themselves during the descent. Once a diver has reached the bottom, he has to attach the rope to the corresponding point with earth hooks. As the anchor chain is not long enough, the tensile force of the rope must be sufficient to secure the boat if the chain on board has not been extended beforehand. This is not assumed. The explosive charge can now be lowered with pinpoint accuracy. The diver must now attach the charge with time fuse to the pipe seam or place it underneath. He must then detach the rope from the hook, unscrew it and secure it.
He can then ascend again on this rope and perform his stops ‘floating’. The boat would no longer have been secured and would have been drifting.
At the same time, at least 1 assistant diver would have had to be present at a depth of between 10 and 30 metres for the entire duration of the dive. Only with a gas mixture of EAN50 would the dive have required no decompression for the entire dive time down to a maximum depth of 15 metres.
However, 2 double 10-litre cylinders and a bailout cylinder with oxygen are also required here. A total of 12 tanks per dive and working diver with assistant would be required.
7 Summary
According to the movement profile, the boat first travelled to the blasting area on the Danish side. From there it travelled to the Swedish area for the task.
Initially, the cargo was to be transferred to both NS 2 strands on the Danish side. This was also successful for strand A. The dive to strand B could not be carried out or had to be cancelled prematurely and there was a change of plan.
The sea area was left to the north-east. It must therefore have been known that the strands of NS 2 also ran in the area of NS 1. There was still the task of sabotaging NS 1 as well. It must therefore have been decided to catch up with the load on strand B of NS 2 there. Due to the large magnetic effects of the UW cable there, compass navigation is very difficult. For this reason, or because of another error, the cargo was not placed on string B as planned, but on string A again.
The explosion profiles of NS 1 and 2 on the Swedish side differ considerably.
When string A of LV 2 exploded at 2.03 a.m., there was a seismic shock of 2.1 and an overpressure peak was registered at the receiving station in Lubmin. The explosions of NS 1 A and B and NS 2 A then took place at 19:04. The seismic strength was 3.1.
NS 1 A and B have pipe elements that have been torn apart, each with 5 craters over a length of 250 to 280 metres. The distance between the two strings is approx. 90 metres. It is theorised that 3 explosive charges were installed per string and that the additional craters were caused by the pipes breaking apart and the escaping gas being flushed out. This theory makes sense if it is assumed that the explosive charges were placed approx. 120 metres apart. If these are now ignited simultaneously, the pressure increase of the charges in the pipe moves towards each other. As a result, a pressure build-up occurs in the centre. As a result, the first of the two explosive charges breaks apart.
The profile of NS 2 on the Swedish side has a completely different signature. While the first blast on the Danish side is still comparable with the pictures of NS 1, here a single explosion at the seam has only formed a lateral crater of approx. 4 x 6 metres and a depth of approx. 4 metres next to the pipeline. This suggests that the explosive device must have been located at the bottom side of the pipeline (see Fig. 9), as in NS 1. Since the blast pattern does not show any pipe elements that have broken apart, it can be assumed that no other explosive devices were present or had detonated and that the pipeline was already almost depressurised. This is a significant feature that indicates that only the presence of gas pressure in the pipeline and three explosive devices can guarantee complete destruction.
A significantly larger quantity would have had to be used to achieve the same level of certainty with a single explosive device. This theory is not conclusively comprehensible and is therefore not considered further.
This means that at least 10 explosive devices, each weighing at least 40kg, were used.
A total of at least 8 dives must have been carried out. Without reserves, this would have been at least 120 cylinders. Figures 10 and 11 are intended to show how much space only 63 cylinders would have required in the boat. As can be seen there, the space conditions are very cramped. Added to this would have been the space required for equipment, explosives, supplies, etc.
There would have been no room for 120 bottles alone on the boat, even if the equipment had remained on deck.
Fig. 10 Cabin view of the Bavaria50 from aft
Fig. 11 Schematic interior with only 63 scuba tanks
Together with the data from point 1.1, the weights can now also be estimated:
Unladen weight of the boat: 13500kg
Permissible total weight: 16000kg
Max. payload: 2500kg
6 persons: 500kg
Explosives: 400kg
120 diving cylinders of 16kg each: 1900kg
Diving equipment: 100kg
Equipment (tools, aids, detonators, etc.): 300kg
Supplies min. 17 days: 100kg
Diesel, water: 1000kg
The weight specifications used were based on lower limits. Even with this, the total payload would have been at least approx. 4300kg. In other words, 1800kg more than permitted. This would have cancelled the operational safety of the boat. As the sea and weather conditions were poor during this period, there was an increased risk of poorer manoeuvrability and lower freeboard.
Why these technically demanding sabotage sites were chosen cannot be explained. At least all 4 strands would have been available in the Swedish area, albeit with diving depths of up to 80 metres.
However, it would have been much easier approx. 45 km SSW of Bornholm. Here, Nord Stream 1 and 2 intersect directly at a depth of only approx. 45 metres.
Fig. 12 Crossing of the NS pipelines in Danish territory, 45km ssw Bornholm
In individual dives, this would have been theoretically possible in the known time window, but would have meant a health risk. This complex work could therefore only have been carried out by saturation divers, as the dives at the bottom times go far beyond the no-decompression times.
As the body is saturated with gases after a certain dive duration at a certain depth, the duration of a dive is no longer relevant. The decompression times do not increase any further.
However, once maximum saturation has been reached, several days are required for subsequent decompression. This is a period of time that is not suitable for ‘wet’ decompression. Only ‘dry’ decompression is an option here. This would have required a diving bell/pressurised chamber.
Saturation divers are specially trained and experienced divers who work for the military or offshore companies. The fact that one of the suspects involved is only supposed to be a diving instructor for the sports sector indicates that this knowledge was far from being available for this operation.
Explosives were allegedly found on a table in the ‘Andromeda’, but no usable DNA material. Forged passports were also allegedly found. It can almost be ruled out that a group that plans and carries out such a complex sabotage mission would subsequently return an uncleaned boat and leave behind false passports.
As with the procurement of explosives, the risk and consequences of a possible tracing would have been too great.
On the way back, they allegedly filled up with diesel in cash for around €1,300 in Wiek harbour. Even a full refuelling at a price of approx. 2€/l would only cost approx. 640€.
8 Result
With an open diving system, these dives would not have been feasible, as there is a risk that the diver(s) would have reached ‘saturation’, which would have meant days of decompression and would not fit anywhere near the known time window. It would have been possible with a closed system, but the space required for this equipment would not have been available on the boat.
The possible payload of equipment, explosives, diving cylinders etc. would have been considerably exceeded at 1800kg, making the operation of the boat a major risk. Redundancies for equipment are not yet taken into account. The weather conditions, this cannot be ruled out, but it is unlikely.
The boat's anchor chain was too short for these depths. An extension would have been possible with a rope, but also unlikely. It would have been at least 30 metres
When refuelling in the port of Wiek, the diesel price for a full tank would have had to be at least 4 euros per litre. That is also unlikely.
The group leaves explosive remnants and forged passports on board. A few hours after the attack in New York, passports belonging to the alleged perpetrators were also found in the rubble of the buildings. Neither is credible due to the risk of tracing.
Since no single point provides clear evidence or circumstantial evidence in favour of the veracity of the version, but all have a high degree of improbability, this can only mean that this version has been constructed for the public to distract from the true events, perpetrators and participants.
But as with constructed stories, often not all factors are considered and harmonised to make a coherent verifiable story. Incalculable factors and careless errors create anomalies.
This is precisely why every point in this report has been scrutinised to find those anomalies that expose this version as a lie.
Another anomaly that is now becoming apparent is the press coverage of this case. There has been no media coverage for months. Progress in the investigation would normally be welcome news.
Update:
Allegedly, an international arrest warrant has been issued by the German judiciary for a Ukrainian who is in Poland. However, the suspect was able to flee to Ukraine in time. This is an attempt to signal to the public that the investigation has allegedly produced results and that the investigation is being pursued with vigour.
Taking all points into account, whether physical, temporal, technical or organisational, the attacks with the ‘Andromeda’ were not carried out.
Since this story originated with the NYT, it stands to reason that it was commissioned by the agency to publish it. In the case of controlled attacks, not only is the execution planned, but a ‘counter-thesis’ is also developed at the same time, which is intended exclusively for the public in order to take the focus away from the actual facts. This is common practice. This report then also reached Germany via the ‘transatlantic bridge’.
Update September 2024
On 8 April 2024, the High Court in London ruled before Nord Stream AG and Lloyd's Insurance Company S. A. that no compensation had to be paid under the insurance policies. The reasoning states, among other things, quote:
‘Further or alternatively, the explosion damage constitutes ‘destruction of or damage to property by or at the direction of a government.
The defendants rely, inter alia, on the fact that the explosion damage could only have been caused by or at the direction of a government (or was at least highly likely to have been caused by or at the direction of a government).
This means that the court cannot consider that the sabotage was carried out by private individuals or companies. The grounds for the judgement do not even begin to mention a possible attack by the ‘Andromeda variant’.
This means that the circumstantial evidence should now completely prove that this story was a blank and inconclusive fabrication for the public.
As with others, the direction was clear from the beginning that this attack in its dimension and complexity could only have been carried out at a stately level or with support. My next task will be to reconstruct which events and connections with which participants correspond to the facts.
Special thanks to Mr. Andersson for his pictures and work. An important basic for this report.
I replied to your first message and asked you questions which you did not answer. Now you are asking new questions. The major media organisations have also reported on what happened to NS 2. But since you apparently don't follow the media, you are trying to get answers from me. My reports are well researched. Please understand that I do not disclose my sources for reasons of protection.
My report on the act of sabotage will be ready soon and I will probably publish it. Perhaps you will then be able to find some answers from it. There will also be a chronological sequence here. Also why one line of NS 2 was blown up twice and the other not, and by whom and in what co-operation
Just getting you back to your hobby here. Adding to the 8th paragraph below figure 9:
In 2016, a German political group became opposition to importing gas from Russia. In 2021, this political group included in their program for federal elections to block Nordstream 2. In spring 2022, individuals from this political corner announced not to take gas from Nordstream as soon as possible. In February 2025, this political group complained Russia stopped delivering.
Sadly, too many still believe in this group's last campaign of the federal elections.
But here is a cool hint and pipeline knowledge is not even required: an answer can be provided by the “plume duration” which was longer for Nordstream than for Nordstream 2. Consequently, there was more gas in Nordstream than in Nordstream 2. Please don’t worry about your 50bar. There is more to revise. Chapter 4 for example. Without pipeline knowledge, one can search for DNVGL and find out the merger of DNV and GL took place after Nordstream was built. Hence, Nordstream could not be built according to this standard. It’s easier for you to remove chapter 4 since it may not help you at all. Instead, there is more to revise...
Please add the source for NSP1's wall thicknesses, external concrete weight coating, MAOPS and operating pressures in September 2022. That way, we can identify unreliable sources. Thanks
Brilliant contribution. The vast majority of people probably feel that the official story doesn't quite fit. But nobody could say exactly why. Even if there are still questions for me, it is clearly explained here why it was a fake. I am not aware of any source that has questioned these details. If you could now find out what actually happened, that would be mega.
thank you for your comment. I ´m indeed working to find out who planned the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and with whose support and knowledge it was carried out. I only need a few more details for verification. However, I still have to decide whether the report will be published here. Surprisingly, there was not much interest in the ‘Andromeda story’.
"The second question is why strand A of NS 2 was blown up at both locations, while strand B remained undamaged along its entire length."
The main question is:
How is such a conclusion possible?
Did you dive approximately 1230km?
This is another very brave statement.
Please add the source.
Thanks
I replied to your first message and asked you questions which you did not answer. Now you are asking new questions. The major media organisations have also reported on what happened to NS 2. But since you apparently don't follow the media, you are trying to get answers from me. My reports are well researched. Please understand that I do not disclose my sources for reasons of protection.
My report on the act of sabotage will be ready soon and I will probably publish it. Perhaps you will then be able to find some answers from it. There will also be a chronological sequence here. Also why one line of NS 2 was blown up twice and the other not, and by whom and in what co-operation
Just getting you back to your hobby here. Adding to the 8th paragraph below figure 9:
In 2016, a German political group became opposition to importing gas from Russia. In 2021, this political group included in their program for federal elections to block Nordstream 2. In spring 2022, individuals from this political corner announced not to take gas from Nordstream as soon as possible. In February 2025, this political group complained Russia stopped delivering.
Sadly, too many still believe in this group's last campaign of the federal elections.
But here is a cool hint and pipeline knowledge is not even required: an answer can be provided by the “plume duration” which was longer for Nordstream than for Nordstream 2. Consequently, there was more gas in Nordstream than in Nordstream 2. Please don’t worry about your 50bar. There is more to revise. Chapter 4 for example. Without pipeline knowledge, one can search for DNVGL and find out the merger of DNV and GL took place after Nordstream was built. Hence, Nordstream could not be built according to this standard. It’s easier for you to remove chapter 4 since it may not help you at all. Instead, there is more to revise...
Thanks for your answer and referencing media in particular. This relates to your level of pipeline expertise.
Again, you write "strand B remained undamaged along its entire length", which means no damage at all over approx. 1230km.
You must confirm this "well researched" statement.
Please add the source for NSP1's wall thicknesses, external concrete weight coating, MAOPS and operating pressures in September 2022. That way, we can identify unreliable sources. Thanks
Brilliant contribution. The vast majority of people probably feel that the official story doesn't quite fit. But nobody could say exactly why. Even if there are still questions for me, it is clearly explained here why it was a fake. I am not aware of any source that has questioned these details. If you could now find out what actually happened, that would be mega.
Hi,
thank you for your comment. I ´m indeed working to find out who planned the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and with whose support and knowledge it was carried out. I only need a few more details for verification. However, I still have to decide whether the report will be published here. Surprisingly, there was not much interest in the ‘Andromeda story’.